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Abstract  
Scaling insurance to transfer climate risk from the rural poor to financial markets is vital to 
enhance agricultural risk management in developing countries, but insurance programs need to 
address several challenges in order to improve resilience at scale. A mix of stakeholder 
expertise is required to design, evaluate and scale insurance programs with the potential to 
enhance resilience among the rural poor. We highlight the contribution that agricultural 
research for development can play by providing data, methods, impact evaluations and other 
research products that can help strengthen and verify the impacts of insurance on resilience at 
scale. These outputs are made available to the insurance industry as public goods in order to 
overcome challenges around, among others, data availability, targeting and design of insurance, 
distribution channels and use of technology, bundling with risk-reducing technologies and 
practices, enabling environments and smart subsidies, and capturing the full value chain. 
 
Keywords 
Climate change; Agricultural risk management; Insurance; Resilience. 
 
About the authors  
Berber Kramer is a Research Fellow in the Markets, Trade and Institutions Division of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and a Project Leader in the CGIAR 
Research Programme on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security’s Flagship on Climate 
Services and Safety Nets. B.Kramer@cgiar.org.  
Jon Hellin is the Sustainable Impact Platform Leader at the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI) in Los Baños, the Philippines. J.Hellin@irri.org 
James Hansen is a Senior Research Scientist at the International Research Institute for 
Climate and Society (IRI) at Columbia University in Palisades, NY, USA.  
Alison Rose is the Science Officer for the CGIAR Research Programme on Climate 
Change, Agriculture and Food Security’s Flagship on Climate Services and Safety Nets. She is 
based at the International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) at Columbia 
University in Palisades, NY, USA. 
Mélody Braun is a Senior Staff Associate at the International Research Institute for Climate 





Funding support for this study was provided by the CGIAR Research Program on Climate 
Change and Agricultural Food Security (CCAFS), which is carried out with support from the 
CGIAR Trust Fund and through bilateral funding agreements. For details please visit 
https://ccafs.cgiar.org/donors. This work was undertaken as part of CCAFS and the CGIAR 
Research Programs on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM) led by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). This paper has not gone through IFPRI’s standard peer-
review procedure. The opinions expressed here belong to the authors, and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the CGIAR or the authors’ institutions. 
Contents  
Introduction: Insurance and climate risk management .................................................. 7 
Pathways for welfare impacts of agricultural insurance .............................................. 10 
Scaling impactful agricultural insurance: Challenges and opportunities ..................... 13 
Data availability ....................................................................................................... 13 
Targeting and design of insurance ........................................................................... 14 
Distribution channels ............................................................................................... 15 
Embedding index insurance in the agricultural value chain .................................... 16 
Regulatory environment........................................................................................... 18 
Role of the public sector .......................................................................................... 19 
AR4D for development and scaling of insurance ........................................................ 20 
Insights from CGIAR research ................................................................................ 21 
Weather security units.............................................................................................. 23 
Gap insurance and fail-safe triggers ........................................................................ 25 
Crop simulation and optimization ............................................................................ 25 
Remote sensing ........................................................................................................ 26 
Bundling insurance with other climate risk management options ........................... 28 
Participatory approaches to index design and implementation................................ 30 
Impact evaluation ..................................................................................................... 31 
Conclusion/recommendations ...................................................................................... 33 
References .................................................................................................................... 34 
 
 
Introduction: Insurance and climate risk management 
In much of the developing world, climate change is expected to increase the risk from extreme 
weather events such as drought, flooding and heat waves (IPCC 2014). Climate shifts and 
extreme weather already threaten tenuous agricultural-based livelihoods. The associated 
damage to livestock, crops and other assets induces farmers to resort to traditional risk 
avoidance mechanisms and costly coping strategies, such as liquidating productive assets, 
borrowing at excessive interest rates or defaulting on existing loans, withdrawing children from 
school to work on-farm, reducing nutrient intake and forgoing health care (Barrett and Carter, 
2001; Carter and Barrett, 2006; Carter et al., 2007; Dercon, 2004; Dercon and Hoddinott, 2005; 
Hoddinott, 2006; McPeak and Barrett, 2001; Wood, 2003; Alderman et al., 2004; Dercon et al., 
2005; Victora et al., 2008). Anticipating the possibility of such losses, farmers also forgo 
profitable yet higher-risk investment opportunities, and incur significant costs trying to 
diversify their livelihoods (Morduch, 1995).  
As a result, the mere anticipation of climate risks can trap already vulnerable households in 
poverty, impeding the kinds of transformation that smallholder agriculture needs to adapt to 
climate change. Studies of drought-prone areas in India and Burkina Faso suggest that farmers 
may sacrifice 12-15% of average income to reduce risk (Gautam et al., 1994). Elbers et al. 
(2007) estimate for farmers in Zimbabwe that this ex ante effect of risk on investments is twice 
as large as the effect of shocks ex post. Reducing risk, for instance by promoting improved 
agricultural technologies, can improve investments in modern inputs, cultivation practices and 
wage labour during normal years, enhancing both productivity and agricultural employment 
(Emerick et al., 2016). As such, the effects of weather shocks are not limited to households for 
whom farming is their main livelihood; production losses have effects more broadly on rural 
economies by reducing local agricultural employment, wages and non-farm income (Hazell and 
Hess, 2017), and by increasing local food prices. 
Agricultural insurance is an important tool in adapting to climate change. By providing 
monetary compensation after a shock, insurance not only prevents farmers from resorting to 
costly coping strategies that could trap them into poverty, but it can also unlock investments in 
higher-risk yet productive agricultural and non-agricultural opportunities before a shock occurs, 
because the mere existence of risk hampers investments. As such, agricultural insurance can 
help increase farmers’ incomes and resilience. Yet, agricultural insurance markets have 
generally failed to provide smallholder farmers with insurance coverage at scale, and where 
scale has been achieved, programs were not necessarily designed to impact resilience and 
adaptation. In this light, leveraging both the power and flexibility of the markets alongside the 
insights of science can help agriculture adapt to the growing risks of climate change. This paper 
discusses how insurance industry can work with agricultural research-for-development (AR4D) 
institutions to leverage the insights, methodologies and research products that have their origin 
in science. 
Traditional indemnity-based crop insurance relies on an assessment of physical loss and, 
hence, requires farm visits to verify insurance claims. Although effective for large-scale farms, 
adverse selection (the tendency for insurance to be purchased preferentially by farmers with 
greater risks, increasing premiums and payouts), moral hazard (the incentive for farmers to 
neglect good risk management in order to receive payouts), and high transaction costs 
associated with verifying claims have made this type of insurance generally unfeasible as 
scalable solution for smallholder farmers. Index-based insurance, on the other hand, has gained 
attention as a promising tool for adapting agriculture to climate risk. Index-based insurance 
triggers payouts based on an index that is correlated with agricultural losses, for instance rainfall 
during a defined period or average yield sampled over a larger region. Such insurance can 
reduce the costs of administering and delivering insurance while eliminating adverse selection 
and moral hazard.  
Since its introduction to the agricultural sector in the mid-1990s, index insurance has 
overcome some of the major obstacles to insuring smallholder farmers in the developing world. 
It is a promising approach for underwriting the costs of government and relief agencies, 
providing a fast and reliable source of funding once an insured catastrophe has occurred. Based 
on a recent review of documented index-based agricultural insurance programs in the 
developing world, Hess and Hazell (2016) estimated that about 198 million farmers are insured, 
divided into approximately 650,000 in Africa, 3.3 million in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and 194.2 million in Asia–of which 160 million are in China and 33.2 million in India. Although 
risk reduction can play a part in stimulating the entrepreneurship and innovation needed for 
agricultural development, until recently, the private sector has played only a minor role in 
insuring farmers in the developing world against agricultural risks. Responsibility for providing 
insurance was largely in the hands of government, relying on public funds to address market 
failures. This is changing with a growing emphasis on climate insurance in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) processes under the Loss and Damage 
track. While it is important to highlight that insurance is not a silver bullet nor a stand-alone 
solution, index insurance is now recognized as a risk management tool with significant potential 
to reduce climate risk and improve welfare for smallholder farmers by protecting livelihoods 
and promoting investments.  
At the same time, as we will argue in this paper, insurance faces several challenges that 
impede the ability of affordable index insurance to strengthen resilience and foster climate 
change adaptation at scale. Scaling introduces for instance the challenge of having to provide 
clients with an understanding of often complicated indices, and of designing products that are 
adequality tailored to local contexts, minimizing basis risk. Basis risk means that the index and 
associated payouts do not correlate adequately with actual crop losses. As a result, farmers may 
end up paying the insurance premium without receiving a payout when experiencing crop 
damage (‘downside’ basis risk). Alternatively, they may receive payouts during good years 
when they did not suffer actual losses (‘upside’ basis risk). Both reduce potential welfare 
impacts of insurance for a risk averse farmer, and thus rational demand for index insurance 
(Clarke, 2016). 
This paper argues that deeper collaboration among experts from insurance, agriculture and 
climate science is required to address these challenges. To that end, we will describe AR4D 
methodologies and research outputs that can help address the challenges faced by the insurance 
and climate change sectors. The paper is structured as follows. We first describe existing 
evidence and gaps in our knowledge on how insurance can both support farmers in protecting 
their livelihoods from catastrophic losses and promote investments in income-enhancing 
opportunities, enabling farmers to become more resilient. Based on a review of secondary 
literature, interviews with key informants and the authors’ experience, the next section 
highlights challenges that warrant concerted multi-stakeholder attention and action in order to 
realize the potential of agricultural insurance as a key component of climate change adaptation. 
The final part of the paper discusses how experts from across the insurance, agriculture and 
climate change sectors can work together to overcome these challenges. We thereby focus on 
applying insights and innovations from AR4D that can be fundamental in overcoming the 
challenges to scaling of agricultural insurance. 
 
  
Pathways for welfare impacts of agricultural insurance  
Climate risk insurance can improve resilience and welfare through at least three 
channels. First, when coping with catastrophic losses from extreme weather events (ex 
post), insurance payouts provide farmers with an alternative source of income, reducing 
their reliance on costly coping strategies. Payouts can help avoid having to sell off one’s 
livestock or enable farmers to re-invest in their fields for the next agricultural season. 
For example, in northern Kenya, insurance payouts for livestock following a drought 
reduced distress sales by 64% among better-off pastoralist households and receiving an 
insurance pay-off reduced the likelihood of rationing food intake by 49 percentage 
points among poorer households (Janzen and Carter 2018). In Ethiopia, payouts from 
the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) project, now known as the 
R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, increased farmers’ savings (Madajewicz et al., 2013). A 
similar program in Senegal protected farmers’ food security from drought (Dalberg 
Global Development Advisors, 2016).  
Second, when anticipating the mere possibility of losses due to extreme weather 
(ex ante), insurance can encourage prudent investments in agriculture, particularly in 
high-return yet higher-risk technologies and innovations. Climate variability reduces 
incentives and opportunities to invest in innovations such as improved seeds, fertilizers 
or other agricultural technologies. While improving incomes during years with good 
weather, these investments aggravate the losses associated with extreme weather 
events. In addition, climate variability has a negative impact on the development of 
rural financial services and supply chains, limiting the availability of credit for 
smallholder farmers in ways that further constrain investment opportunities and 
reinforce poverty at the farm level. Agricultural insurance transfers the risk from local 
actors in agricultural value chains to financial markets, which may help boost the 
investment confidence on part of both farmers and other actors in the agricultural value 
chain, including the financial sector (Carter et al., 2016). Improved access to credit 
could help farmers take advantage of productive opportunities that can bring them 
higher income in most years.1 
 
 
1 For example, evaluation of the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative in Ethiopia showed that insurance allowed farmers to 
increase their savings, increase the number of draught animals, access more credit, and invest more in inputs such as 
Third, index insurance should not be seen as a complete or stand-alone solution 
for all agricultural risks. It can be used to complement other risk management strategies. 
For example, a farmer can protect against yield losses from moderate droughts by using 
drought-tolerant seeds. In the likely scenario that these seeds are more expensive than 
regular seeds, a risk averse farmer may prefer not making this investment, even if 
profitable in expectation, because the seeds only protect them from moderate droughts; 
during years with an extreme drought, pest or disease attack, or other weather 
calamities, a farmer would lose the investment, and if the inputs were paid for through 
a loan, this would put them at risk of default. Index insurance can, hence, build 
resilience by not only providing a payout in bad years to help farmers protect their 
assets, but also by unlocking opportunities to increase investments in risk-mitigating 
technologies that protect farmers from the downside risks of more regular bad weather 
events, allowing insurance coverage to focus on only the most extreme events for which 
technologies are unable to offer protection. 
Empirical evidence on the size of private and social benefits conferred by 
insurance through each of these three mechanisms is however generally lacking. Impact 
evaluations in several settings indicate that index insurance affects smallholder farmers’ 
livelihood strategies, investments and technology adoption ex ante. However, these 
studies often evaluate smaller-scale pilot studies, and there is limited evidence that the 
impacts on productivity, profitability and incomes—if observed—are large enough to 
offset program costs. This suggests that farmers mainly experience benefits from 
insurance payouts ex post, by improving their ability to cope with extreme weather 
events. More research is needed on whether and how insurance generates adaptation 
benefits ex ante, that is, whether the increased investments due to risk reduction indeed 
help households build resilience and improve their incomes during years without 
insurance payouts, and if not, why this is not the case. It could be that improvements in 
income take more time to materialize than the time horizon of the typical impact 
evaluation. Alternatively, such impacts may require a more enabling environment in 
 
 
fertilizers and improved seeds (Madajewicz et al. 2013). The ACRE (Agriculture and Risk Enterprise Ltd., formerly 
Kilimo Salama) initiative reported that insured farmers invested 19% more in farm productivity, resulting in 16% 
more earnings compared to their uninsured neighbours (IFC, 2013). Further evidence that index insurance enhances 
adoption of improved production technologies comes from evaluations and experimental studies with farmers in 
Bangladesh, India, Ghana, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Ethiopia and Zambia. 
which insurance is not communicated and offered as a stand-alone solution, but as an 
instrument to provide farmers with access to credit, improved production technologies, 
high-value output markets, and agricultural advisories to guide investments. Impacts of 
insurance on coping ex post are important but the lack of income effects ex ante will 
undermine its potentially transformative impacts. 
A second evidence gap in the literature is whether insurance reaches its full 
potential in enabling financial institutions, agro-dealers and other actors in the value 
chain to expand their businesses and provide improved services to smallholders, and 
whether this is a cost-effective strategy in creating resilience at scale. A few studies 
have examined impacts of insurance on access to credit and technology adoption, and 
on farmers’ uptake of index insurance when bundled with technology (Carter et al., 
2016; Carter et al., 2017), but there have been very few evaluation studies to show the 
full impacts on resilience. In addition, evidence about demand and scaling potential 
remains mixed and controversial, especially when it comes to equity in terms of what 
types of farmers have best access to insurance and whether insurance diminishes or 
exacerbates inequalities in farming communities (Fisher et al., 2019). Although many 
studies analyse how to increase adoption among the poor, uptake is not an indicator of 
welfare, leaving room for studies on distributional impacts of index insurance.  
The next section describes challenges to achieving impacts at scale. Note that it 
is insufficient to analyse take-up and renewal alone as indicators of impact. Take-up 
and renewal, especially in meso- or macro-level programs, but even in micro-insurance 
programs, are not necessarily indicative of welfare-enhancing and cost-effective 
products. Instead, to track impacts of insurance, cost-benefit analyses and impact 
studies are needed, particularly those spanning a longer term and exploring welfare 
impacts of insurance offered at different levels (macro, meso and micro), along with 
complementary options. These would help guide decisions about when public financing 
might yield a positive net social return. It will be important to build more long-term 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) components into future insurance programs, and this 
paper describes how the AR4D can contribute towards this goal. 
 
Scaling impactful agricultural insurance: Challenges 
and opportunities 
There are many challenges to making (index) insurance strengthen resilience at scale. 
Because of the complex nature of these challenges and the marginal contexts within 
developing countries in which the product is being rolled out, overcoming them requires 
concerted effort by stakeholders from across the insurance, agriculture and climate 
change sectors. We highlight these challenges and identify how the insurance and 
agricultural research communities can work together to turn them into opportunities. 
The next section will detail specific contributions that agricultural researchers can 
make. While we focus more on index insurance than insurance per se, they are also 
applicable to indemnity insurance not least because one of the added values of 
agricultural research is that it is improving how we measure yields and management 
practices, making it possible to come closer to indemnity insurance again (Ceballos and 
Kramer, 2019). 
 
Data availability  
A crucial factor determining the benefits of index insurance is the accuracy of the index: 
the greater the correlation with losses suffered by the insured, the greater the potential 
benefit. While it is impossible to fully eliminate basis risk in index insurance, it is 
critical to minimize it through careful index selection, cross-validating the index using 
several data sources, including farmers’ input through participatory processes, and 
designing a contract that maps the index data to historical and anticipated patterns of 
losses (IRI 2013). To design and implement high-quality indices, index insurance needs 
place-specific data on historical yields, rainfall and other production hazards. However, 
these data are often sparse and of low quality, which is a key hurdle that needs to be 
addressed for index insurance to achieve scale.  
A promising solution is being provided by Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT). Much can be gained from investing in national meteorological 
services’ infrastructure, such as weather stations, rain gauges and gridded weather 
datasets, and harnessing these data to identify weather indices that capture the risks that 
are important to farmers. There is however a tension between the use of weather stations 
and rain gauges versus satellite data. Weather stations are increasingly established at 
lower cost but are often not equally distributed and introduce possibilities for 
technological and manual errors. They require investments are required in procurement 
and maintenance, and new weather stations come without site-specific historical 
records. Gridded satellite data are available for longer periods of time at a lower cost 
but provide estimates of weather conditions, potentially reducing accuracy. Merged 
datasets that calibrate satellite weather data with station data offer a potential solution 
to improve gridded datasets and reconstruct historical data gaps (Dinku et al., 2018). 
Using such datasets requires capacity building on part of both insurers and farmers, due 
to a lack of familiarity and tangibility of these data.  
Moreover, given challenges in designing weather index insurance, countries 
such as India and Kenya have shifted to area-based yield insurance for regions and crops 
where sufficient historical yield data has been available. As an index, these programs 
suffer because official yield measurements can be unreliable or biased, and are often 
reported late after the harvest, leading to delays in payment. Furthermore, collecting 
area-based yield insurance at a high spatial resolution within the short period before 
harvest, while the crop is still on the ground, is a daunting operation. In response to 
these challenges, recent innovations in ICT are focusing on indices that use satellite 
remote sensing to predict agricultural losses, for instance through cloud cover, 
vegetation cover, or soil moisture for a chosen region during critical agricultural 
periods. AR4D and climate science can help the insurance sector utilize this increased 
availability of quality data for the development of more robust indices. 
 
Targeting and design of insurance  
For index insurance to achieve scale it needs to be appropriately targeted. Farmers are 
not homogenous. The diversity of smallholder farmers’ needs requires different 
insurance solutions. In some cases, insurance may not be an appropriate intervention. 
How do we understand better the demand for insurance as well as the welfare impacts 
among different types of farmers, and develop products that target men and women 
farmers’ context-specific needs, packaged at the right scale (e.g., individual farmer, 
aggregator, national government)? How do we identify which farmers should be 
targeted for insurance while recognizing those for whom insurance is not appropriate? 
And how do we ensure that insurance is packaged in a way that complements men and 
women farmers’ livelihood needs in ways that can be integrated into their on-going 
climate adaptation and climate service initiatives?  
Agricultural researchers and development practitioners have developed various 
livelihood frameworks that can be helpful in targeting the sorts of farmers who are most 
likely to be receptive to insurance. These frameworks have been integrated into recent 
policy approaches to the agricultural sector (e.g. DFID, 2015). For instance, Oxfam, the 
UN World Food Programme and partners have been developing the R4 Rural Resilience 
program that allows very poor yet productive farmers to take out insurance in return for 
labour. Eligible farmers in Ethiopia, Senegal, Malawi, Zambia, Kenya and Zimbabwe 
can enrol in insurance coverage in exchange for their work on resilience-building 
activities in their community. At a macro-level, the African Risk Capacity (ARC) is 
providing insurance to members of the African Union in order to finance their 
humanitarian response operations when facing natural disasters such as drought, and 
ARC’s Replica Coverage allows UN agencies and other humanitarian actors to match 
these country insurance policies. The aim of this initiative is to finance an expansion of 
food aid or social safety nets primarily for the extreme poor and vulnerable who would 
be unable to finance insurance premiums themselves.  
 
Distribution channels 
Farmers’ demand for insurance and their capacity to access it will be weakened if there 
are lengthy forms to be filled out or special journeys to make to register or receive a 
payout. The power of technology and big data can be harnessed to make the payment 
and claim processes even more simple and timely. Some insurers are taking advantage 
of mobile phone and mobile banking technologies. A good example are the ACRE 
Africa insurance products in East Africa, which enable farmers to pay their insurance 
premiums and receive payouts via the M-PESA mobile banking system (Hess and 
Hazell, 2017). Using mobile money and objective triggers such as rainfall, measured 
near real-time, allows insurers to disburse payouts rapidly, which can make insurance 
a much more attractive proposition for farmers. One challenge of using mobile phones 
is to ensure that the technology reaches both men and women, considering that mobile 
phones are still mainly owned by the male head of the household in many rural cultures.  
Few private insurers have the required distribution networks in rural areas so 
they often work through an intermediary with an existing network of their own (e.g., a 
microfinance institution, bank, input dealer, agro-processor, or NGO), or they work 
with groups of farmers who can be insured as single entities. Farmers may not 
understand or trust the insurance, especially when it is new, and this adds to the 
perceived risk of buying it. The existence of basis risk means that transparent 
communication is crucial for trust. But index technologies that reduce basis risk can be 
more complex and hence more challenging for farmers and other stakeholders to 
understand and trust. It is important to market the insurance through existing 
distribution channels that farmers use and trust, such as microfinance or input suppliers. 
Even where farmers already trust the distribution channel, appropriate training 
and participation of farmers in the process from the start are crucial to building their 
trust in the eventual insurance products. Communicating index insurance, a potentially 
complex product, to farmers and other stakeholders requires large investments in 
consumer education and marketing. The process includes giving farmers a voice in 
insurance design as this can improve uptake and satisfaction. Participatory methods that 
have proven effective, however, are challenging to scale up. How can farmers’ needs 
and realities be incorporated into the design of tailored solutions at scale, in a cost-
effective manner? To what extent can ICT and especially mobile phones be exploited 
to enable farmers to play a greater role in product development at scale?  
A focus on distribution channels also raises the issue of how the insurance is 
best marketed, and, whether to do so at a micro-, meso- or macro-level. There are 
distinct advantages to focusing at the meso-level. One of these advantages is that 
aggregating risk to the meso-level helps overcome basis risk arising from idiosyncratic 
risks in production. A relief agency, microfinance institution, agricultural input supplier 
or farmer group can pool farm-level variation and seek insurance for covariate risks that 
cannot be pooled at the meso-level. Basis risk is however not eliminated by 
underwriting risks at the meso- or macro-level. Index insurance offered at these 
aggregated levels can still suffer from inadequate index design, data quality issues, and 
covariate losses that are not directly tied to the index variable such as weather-sensitive 
pests. 
 
Embedding index insurance in the agricultural value chain 
Many successful programs provide insurance as a bundled product with other services, 
including credit, modern inputs and better technologies, or to a better market outlet 
(e.g., contract farming), all of which can make the insurance part of a real value-adding 
proposition for insured farmers that extends beyond the value of its direct risk-reducing 
benefits (Hazell and Hess, 2017). This has led to successful cases where index insurance 
is packaged with other types of insurance that farmers find attractive, such as life or 
accident insurance. NWK AgriServices in Zambia has built weather and life insurance 
into its cotton farming contracts, in order to enhance farmers’ loyalty and deliveries, 
and secure them against debt and livelihood problems in case of weather failures 
(Hazell and Hess, 2017). Bundling insurance policies with other financial services such 
as credit can also lower the costs of distribution and premium collection, since 
premiums can be deducted from loans and factored into interest rates. Meanwhile, 
reduced risk exposure could result in lower interest rates or expanded access to credit, 
if leading to a lower default risk. 
Successful agricultural index insurance initiatives treat insurance as just one 
component of agricultural risk management, and some bundle insurance products 
within credit or technology packages. Hess and Hazell (2016) give the example of 
Zambia, where farmers emphasized the need for insurance to be embedded in the entire 
agricultural value chain. They expressed a strong need to increase their productivity and 
cope with production and post-production risks, which would require better access to 
quality farming inputs, irrigation, mechanization and other investments. These insights 
provide an opportunity to link index insurance with agricultural technologies and 
practices that help farmers reduce their exposure to risk, often without reducing 
productivity. The question, however, is to how to identify the most suitable climate-
smart technologies and practices in a given context. 
A related opportunity to increase the contribution of index insurance to 
agricultural resilience is to expand coverage beyond farmers, and beyond particular 
farm enterprises. These include financial institutions, agricultural traders and 
processors, landless workers, and village shopkeepers who are dependent directly or 
indirectly on local agriculture, and whom in turn can be adversely impacted by a 
drought and reduced agricultural production. One example of this broader insurance 
approach is the Livelihood Protection Policy (LPP) in the Caribbean. This insures non-
salaried income earners against adverse weather events, such as high wind speed and/or 
excessive rainfall (Hazell and Hess, 2016). Insurance does not need to be tied to specific 
crops and can in principle be sold to anyone. This raises the possibility of insuring 
anybody in a region whose income is correlated with the insured event, including but 
not confined to farmers. 
 
Regulatory environment  
There are three types of agents that are active in providing agricultural insurance to 
smallholder farmers: the private for-profit sector, governments (public), and 
development organizations, including non-profits such as NGOs and international 
organizations. They have their own networks for distributing insurance to farmers. 
Since most of these organizations are not licensed to sell insurance, they inevitably 
partner with private insurers who provide and underwrite the insurance contracts. Other 
agencies help finance and initiate insurance programs, including bilateral donors, 
United Nations (UN) organizations and multinational development banks. Such 
agencies can play an important role since private insurers can face high setup costs and 
barriers to entry. For example, these agencies provide technical and financial assistance 
to help private insurers overcome high initial investment costs in research and 
development of index insurance products. Such costs might not be easily recouped if 
competitors can replicate products that prove profitable to sell. 
Establishing a legal and regulatory environment for enforcing contracts that 
both buyer and seller can trust is a fundamental prerequisite for scaling insurance. This 
requires attention to incentives, monitoring product quality, support through public-
private partnerships, and enabling regulatory frameworks. In low-income countries 
where index insurance is expanding, achieving these aspects can prove challenging. 
Sometimes insurers use their own networks to sell insurance directly to farmers, but 
more often they work through other players along value chains who sell directly to 
farmers. For example, they may link up with agro-processors, input suppliers, or seed 
companies that offer farmers insurance along with credit, seeds, fertilizer, or contract 
farming arrangements. These players typically do the marketing, servicing and 
subsidizing of insurance, with the advantage that such partnerships (facilitated by the 
aggregation of farmers in for instance farmer groups) establish linkages between private 
insurers and farmers whom would otherwise not be reached.  
An enabling regulatory environment also means introducing minimum quality 
standards for insurance products, monitoring product compliance with these standards, 
and certifying those products that meet the standards. Farmers may lose their trust in 
insurance markets because they are worse off buying insurance compared to staying 
without coverage due to high premium rates, basis risk, poor product quality more 
generally, or a combination of these factors. Regulatory bodies can help build trust in 
insurance markets by monitoring whether products do no harm compared to not having 
insurance at all, and whether premium subsidies do in fact improve smallholder 
farmers’ welfare in a cost-effective way, by comparing farmers’ ex-ante welfare from 
a premium subsidy with the benefits from a similarly sized cash transfer (Carter and 
Chiu, 2018).  
Additionally, laws and regulations need to be consistent with international 
standards to improve the chances of insurers gaining access to global markets for risk 
transfer. It is critical that insurers have access to appropriate reinsurance coverage. 
Assured and timely payments received from a reinsurer, when a disaster occurs, can 
help avoid some of the delays and uncertainties incurred in obtaining emergency 
funding from government and/or donor sources (Clarke and Vargas Hill, 2013). 
Reinsurance can also help smooth out the annual cost of a disaster assistance program 
to governments and donors in the form of a predictable and regular annual premium 
given that such a program aggregates any losses to a regional scale (Hess and Hazell, 
2016). Laws and regulations must harmonize with international standards to improve 
the chances of insurers gaining access to global markets for risk transfer. 
 
Role of the public sector  
The public sector plays an important role in creating an enabling environment for index 
insurance. This includes investing in weather stations and agro-meteorological research 
and data systems, educating farmers about the value of insurance, building the capacity 
of the insurance sector on index insurance, and facilitating international reinsurance. 
There may also be a need for “smart” subsidies to correct initial market failures and 
externalities that hold back the development of markets for index insurance products 
(Hazell and Varangis, 2019). These subsidies should serve a well-defined policy 
objective, target a well-defined set of beneficiaries, be informed by monitoring and 
evaluation, and have either a clear exit strategy or a viable long-term financing strategy. 
For instance, subsidies directed at costs of developing and administering insurance to 
overcome initial program setup may be more cost-effective and less distorting than 
direct subsidies to premiums. If premiums are subsidized, the literature recommends 
providing subsidies on a per-farmer rather than proportional basis, to equitably support 
relatively poor smallholder farmers; and ensuring that farmers’ portion of the premiums 
is not less than the long-term average expected payout, to avoid disincentives to 
managing risk through other available means. 
Insuring against agricultural risks is expensive. In many countries, catastrophic 
events like droughts occur with such a high frequency that premium rates may need to 
exceed 10–15 percent of the total sum insured just to cover the amount that insurers 
expect to pay farmers in the form of claims (i.e., the average annual loss or actuarially 
fair premium rate). Subsidies will usually be less distorting if made directly to the 
insurer to offset administration, infrastructure, and development costs rather than 
subsidizing the premium rates paid by farmers. Premium subsidies for products that 
cover specific crops may encourage farmers to grow unsuitable crops in risky 
environments, leading to net social losses and adding to the future costs of insurance 
and the size of the subsidy.  
There are other innovative ways to deal with farmers’ inability to pay for a 
premium. Index insurance is designed to cover the most extreme risks that a farmer can 
face. Smaller risks are more efficiently addressed through a range of cheaper risk 
management strategies such as credit, savings and risk-reducing practices and 
technologies. Index insurance is expected to be the last recourse, but it can be expensive. 
Initiatives such as the ‘work-for-insurance’ strategies developed by the R4 Rural 
Resilience Initiative can help tackle this challenge by allowing farmers to pay the 
premium by providing labour to public works programs that help build the 
infrastructure to better manage risks. The requirement that farmers need to invest either 
some time or money in the insurance product gives the insurance providers an incentive 
to provide a high-quality product that responds to farmers’ needs, while the option to 
pay the insurance premium through labour means that the product remains affordable 
for cash-constrained farmers. 
AR4D for development and scaling of insurance  
Given these challenges, the process of scaling up insurance to achieve resilience calls 
for a mix of stakeholder expertise. One area where we see tremendous and largely 
underutilized synergy is the contribution that agricultural research can make to 
overcome the aforementioned challenges to scaling insurance. As a leader in poverty-
focused agricultural innovation, the CGIAR can offer a large knowledge base in this 
regard. The CGIAR, established in 1971, is a global network of 15 international 
agricultural research institutions and their partners, all working to advance agricultural 
science and innovation to reduce poverty, improve food and nutrition security, and to 
improve natural resources and ecosystem services. Researchers within the CGIAR 
network produce, in partnership with actors from both public and private sectors, global 
public goods including agricultural production technologies, data, methods, tools, 
analyses and evidence. These public goods can contribute to overcoming the challenges 
to scaling impactful agricultural insurance schemes. 
Insights from CGIAR research 
CGIAR research can contribute to the scaling of high-quality insurance schemes in at 
least four distinct ways. First, the CGIAR has worked since its establishment on 
developing and understanding context-specific viable production technologies and 
livelihood options that are available to smallholder farmers. Second, it has a deep 
understanding of the constraints and risks (beyond those targeted by insurance) that 
smallholder farmers face, and how they impact management decisions and smallholder 
farmers’ welfare. Third, the network has established relationships with relevant 
institutions in the agricultural sector and can provide guidance on how to engage them 
to strengthen agricultural insurance. Fourth, the CGIAR offers independence from an 
insurance provider’s financial interests, and it offers peer review that can help with 
quality control of good practice knowledge and evidence.  
For instance, one of the potentially valuable contributions from A4RD and the 
CGIAR focuses on positioning insurance in a context of a broader resilience strategy, 
including other complementary climate risk management tools often developed or 
validated through research conducted by the CGIAR. Reviewing the evidence on 
climate risk management and rural poverty reduction, Hansen et al. (2019) argue that 
risk-reducing production technologies and practices originating from AR4D—
including stress-adapted crop germplasm (used to make seeds more tolerant to risks 
such as drought, floods or disease), conservation agriculture and diversified crop and 
agroforestry production systems — stabilize agricultural production and incomes, and, 
hence, can reduce under certain circumstances the adverse impacts of climate-related 
risk. This is relevant to the design of index-based insurance since the latter plays a 
complementary role in enabling farmers to manage risk, overcoming risk-related 
barriers to adoption of improved technologies and practices, and protecting their assets 
against the impacts of extreme climatic events. 
Moreover, AR4D offers insights into the roles that alternative climate-risk 
management interventions (technologies and practices versus index-based insurance 
and social protection through adaptive safety nets) can play in efforts to reduce rural 
poverty, particularly for different types of environments and farming populations. 
Targeting interventions to improve farmers’ wellbeing in the face of climate risk 
requires distinguishing between different types of farmers (Barrett et al., 2007; Hellin 
and Fisher, 2018; Hansen et al., 2019). First, productive safety net interventions such 
as index-based insurance protect the vulnerable non-poor from falling into poverty 
when coping with shocks. Second, productivity-enhancing technologies and practices, 
complemented by improved climate risk management, or ‘cargo nets’ (Barret, 2005), 
enable those farmers just below the poverty line to escape poverty, allowing them to 
join the ranks of the vulnerable non-poor. Third, layered safety net interventions protect 
the poor with fewer assets, for whom production technologies are unlikely to be 
adequate, from destitution after a shock. 
The AR4D community has also developed, tested and evaluated innovations in 
index insurance. Because much of this research was implemented through the CGIAR 
or with the CGIAR’s partners, we conducted an inventory of recent insurance-related 
research projects undertaken within the CGIAR as a starting point. We reviewed these 
research projects to identify (potential) innovations delivered by these projects.2 
CGIAR research has aimed to address challenges to scaling insurance-driven resilience 
impacts through innovations such as weather securities, gap insurance, crop simulations 
and optimization, remote sensing, linking value chains stakeholders with the insurance 
industry, bundling insurance with climate risk-reducing technologies, as well as other 




2 It is important to note that this inventory is not meant to be exhaustive; there is a large body of research on 
innovations for agricultural insurance also outside the CGIAR but focusing on the CGIAR offered a starting point 
and hence the focus of this paper. 
Reviewing these projects highlighted both the spread in regions and countries 
in which the CGIAR has implemented insurance activities, and the range of innovations 
being researched. In terms of geographic coverage, the CGIAR has conducted insurance 
research in Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania and Mozambique in the Africa region; 
in Uruguay, Honduras, Nicaragua in Latin and Central America; in Syria and Egypt in 
the Middle East, and in India and Bangladesh in South Asia. Research has spanned a 
multitude of innovations, including aspects relating to the targeting and design of 
insurance, as well as projects addressing issues around distribution channels and the use 
of technology. A substantial number of projects aims to help improve data availability 
and bundling with other informal or formal financial services. The CGIAR has also 
conducted several rigorous evaluations to assess the impacts of these innovations on 
resilience. Research has looked less often into the regulatory environment; creating an 
enabling environment or using smart subsidies; and capturing the full value chain. 
These challenges provide areas for future research. 
Weather security units 
A first set of studies in Ethiopia, India and Uruguay (Hill and Robles, 2011; Hill, Robles 
and Ceballos, 2016; Ceballos and Robles, 2017) explores the demand for weather 
security units as a more flexible alternative to weather-based index insurance. The 
weather securities analysed in these studies are simple insurance units designed for 
smallholder farmers with strong heterogeneity in cropping patterns, for instance due to 
variation in crops or varieties grown, sowing dates, or risk exposure. The key idea is 
that farmers can choose from a menu of different insurance products, for instance with 
different coverage periods, different triggers (attachment points) or different coverage 
amounts (exhaustion points), to best suit their risk profile. As such, these products help 
improve the design of insurance as they offer farmers the flexibility to express 
heterogeneity in demand. 
In addition, weather securities relax data availability requirements; instead of 
having to correlate historical weather indices with historical yield, and setting insurance 
parameters such as triggers, exit values and the sum insured based on those correlations, 
weather securities allow farmers to construct their optimal insurance portfolio 
themselves to match their expected yields under different weather realizations. Farmers 
may for instance know how much rain they need and when and, hence, can decide on 
what insurance product would best suit their needs. In this way, the weather securities 
relax data requirements by reducing basis risk in a temporal dimension (by allowing 
farmers to choose coverage for the period during which they are at risk) and from a 
design perspective (because farmers now use their own knowledge on the types of 
weather conditions required by their crops when purchasing their weather securities). 
The studies in Ethiopia and Uruguay demonstrate that farmers mix and match 
the weather security units to construct an insurance portfolio based on personal risk 
exposure. Data collected during both an experimental game and real purchases of such 
insurance policies among farmers in southern Ethiopia suggest that the securities are 
well understood and can fit heterogeneous farmer needs. In Uruguay, farmers purchased 
insurance for different months, and with different triggers, depending on their crops and 
soil type, as well as cropping decisions. In other words, farmers construct their own risk 
management portfolios based on their perceived insurance needs, and the availability 
of more flexible insurance products allows doing so. Nevertheless, demand was 
strongly price sensitive, and an important area for future research is whether the 
flexibility of the weather units approach increases or decreases demand. Literature on 
menu effects suggests that the quality of decisions deteriorates as a decision-maker is 
presented with a larger number of options to choose from, and this may well be the case 
when farmers need to choose among a large number of flexible weather units (Ceballos 
and Robles, 2017). 
However, from a more general perspective, farmers’ significant heterogeneity 
in demand, which is correlated with heterogeneity in their farming practices, is 
important. It highlights that there is no one-size-fits-all weather-based index insurance 
product, and that the different needs that farmers have when managing their productions 
risks are important to consider in the design and targeting of climate risk insurance. 
Even if weather securities themselves might be challenging to implement, this finding 
offers an important motivation for the use of methodologies that design index insurance 
based on weather simulations and crop modelling, by using remote sensing, and/or 
through participatory approaches. Each of these methodologies acknowledges that is 
important to consider the heterogeneity across farmers in their exposure to weather 
risks, and the difficulties that insurance programs would face in capturing this 
heterogeneity by means of a simple one-size-fits-all weather-based index insurance 
product. 
Gap insurance and fail-safe triggers 
Another innovation aims to reduce downside basis risk in index insurance through so-
called ‘gap insurance’, also referred to as fail-safe contract design (Carter et al., 2017). 
This approach was introduced first in a pilot project in Ethiopia, where a failure-prone 
rainfall index was backed up by the possibility of conducting an area yield audit 
(Berhane et al., 2015). Specifically, in case the rainfall index did not trigger a payout, 
but farmers reported that they had suffered severe damage, they could petition for the 
insurance provider to conduct a crop-cutting exercise in their village. Payouts would be 
made if the average yield measured was below a predefined threshold. This hybrid 
model in which the contract design combines both weather index-based insurance and 
area-yield index-based coverage reduces downside basis risk, thereby making insurance 
more attractive.  
This approach was also adopted in an impact evaluation of weather index-based 
insurance in Bangladesh (Vargas Hill et al., 2018), and the mechanism design behind 
this approach is further developed within the context of a pilot project in Tanzania 
(Flatnes and Carter, 2015). There, combining zone-level yields, predicted based on 
satellite observations of rainfall, with a crop-cut audit that is initiated at the request of 
farmers (if they indeed believe that yields in their zone are below 60% of normal yields), 
improves the accuracy of insurance payouts. This contract could be offered at a lower 
cost than an area-yield index contract if the rainfall index is sufficiently accurate, and 
if there is a penalty for farmers who call for an audit if they did not suffer severe damage 
in their zone, so that the insurance provider needs to carry out the costly crop-cut audits 
only in a limited number of scenarios. In that case, the cost of the insurance policy can 
remain well below those of area-yield index contracts, with a comparable accuracy, 
leading to increased welfare gains. 
Crop simulation and optimization 
A second set of studies involve applications of crop simulation modelling to index 
insurance design, implemented for contract design in various contexts including 
Honduras, India, Nicaragua, Syria and Uruguay (Kost et al., 2012; Ceballos, 2016; 
Shirsath et al., 2019). The stochastic weather modelling that these crop simulations 
often use will help fill in missing weather data, thereby addressing challenges around 
the absence of reliable weather data for estimating probabilities of insurance payouts 
and thus premiums. In this way, crop modelling can be used to calibrate insurance 
triggers or attachment points and exits or exhaustion points, along with the associated 
insurance premiums, to existing heterogeneity in soil characteristics.  
Heterogeneity in soil characteristics can be an important source of basis risk, 
and a challenge in targeting and designing index insurance products. In Nicaragua, 
researchers were able to overcome this challenge through a crop modelling approach. 
They interpolated monthly data on precipitation as well as temperature means and 
ranges from observed weather station data in the tropics and subtropics, and used these 
data, combined with farm plot-level characteristics, to simulate crop yields within crop 
models for how the biochemistry, physiology and agronomy determines crop water 
balance, photosynthesis, growth and development. These data were used to estimate a 
crop’s minimum water requirements at fixed intervals during its growth and 
development, that is, for different time-blocks of the growing season. Triggers were 
based on the predicted probabilities that a crop would not meet its water requirements.  
In India, a similar approach was applied to insurance contract design: combining 
agro-meteorological statistical analysis, crop growth modelling and optimization 
techniques, Shirsath et al. (2019) develop contracts that increased farmer satisfaction 
by 50 and 72 percent for soybean and pearl millet, respectively, while increasing the 
correlation of payouts with yield losses (i.e., reducing basis risk), and reducing the 
overall loss-cost ratio, lowering the required insurance premium subsidy per farmer 
insured. Similar approaches are underway in other contexts, and the tools to develop 
these improved contract designs are typically available for the insurance industry to 
use, free of charge. 
Remote sensing 
Each of the innovations mentioned above require weather-based indices to capture the 
risks that are important to smallholder farmers, and to be reliable predictors of crop 
yields, which is not always the case, resulting in basis risk. Advances in remote sensing 
and “big data” analytics are expanding the range of options for reducing basis risk but 
have yet to be fully tested and exploited. The European Union’s new satellite system 
Sentinel-2A could be a game changer for the types of indices that can be developed and 
monitored around the developing world. Using such data however requires biophysical 
or statistical models that relate remotely sensed data to the agricultural losses to be 
insured. AR4D can play an important role in this regard.  
The Index Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) project is one of the better-known 
and successful applications of remote sensing to provide index insurance to smallholder 
farmers at scale. The IBLI project has developed a remotely-sensed vegetation index 
calibrated against mortality survey data to insure livestock mortality losses for pastoral 
households in northern Kenya and Ethiopia (Mude et al., 2010). Products have been 
shown to generate positive welfare impacts (Chantarat et al., 2017), to be more cost-
effective in comparison with cash transfers (Jensen, Barrett and Mude, 2017), and to 
improve coping strategies by allowing poorer households to limit food rationing when 
experiencing droughts (Janzen and Carter, 2018). 
Vegetation indices are a good indicator of livestock mortality as pastoralists’ 
livestock survival is largely dependent on forage, and reductions in forage availability 
are easily detected by vegetation indices. Measuring crop productivity is more difficult, 
especially in areas with intercropping, due to increased heterogeneity and smaller plots. 
In addition, remote satellites may not be very tangible to farmers, and available low-
cost satellite imagery can be too coarse (either in terms of spatial resolution, or in terms 
of temporal resolution, especially in seasons with cloud cover) to accurately measure 
ground conditions at the localized level for which a smallholder farmer will need 
insurance. To overcome challenges related to cloud cover, the Remote sensing-based 
Information and Insurance for Crops for Emerging Economies (RIICE) project has used 
AR4D to pioneer a radar satellite data-based system that allows for accurate and timely 
measurement of planted areas and yields for rice in Asia (Hess and Hazell, 2016).  
Another strand of CGIAR research on insurance is analysing the potential 
impacts of linking index-based insurance with picture-based insurance, which uses 
farmers’ georeferenced ground pictures of the insured crops to measure crop damage 
for insurance purposes (Ceballos et al., 2019). A mobile app collects data, including 
pictures and self-reported practices and input use, with high frequency, both pre- and 
post-damage. These pictures are sent to an online server, where experts identify the 
extent of damage. These data are used to build large training datasets for machine 
learning algorithms that can automate the process to rapidly trigger payouts.  
Compared to traditional indemnity insurance, this will reduce the costs of loss 
verification; compared to index insurance products, this improves the tangibility of the 
insurance product, and potentially reduces basis risk if the pictures capture localized 
losses that cannot be measured through satellite imagery or weather stations. In a pilot 
implementation of this approach in the rice-wheat belt of India, nearly two-thirds of 
trained farmers took at least four pictures (roughly one per growth stage), which was 
considered sufficient for loss assessment; severe damage was visible from the pictures 
in 71 percent of affected sites; and this reduced basis risk significantly compared to 
alternative index-based products (Ceballos et al., 2019). Hufkens et al. (2019) find that 
the images also improve upon satellite measurements of NDVI when detecting crop 
growth stages or lodging events for winter wheat in India. An interesting avenue to 
explore is whether pictures can be used to expand agro-advisory services, and whether 
there are benefits from bundling advisory services with picture-based insurance 
(Ceballos et al., 2018). The innovation is currently being tested by several major 
insurance initiatives as a strategy to reduce basis risk in their index insurance products.   
Bundling insurance with other climate risk management options 
Bundling provides an excellent opportunity for the insurance industry to utilize outputs 
from AR4D. AR4D has over the last two to three decades developed and tested many 
climate-smart agricultural technologies and practices, including stress-adapted 
germplasm from advances in breeding (for instance drought-tolerant maize and flood-
tolerant rice), diversified farming systems including agroforestry, and conservation 
agriculture, which is a system of practices that reduces soil disturbance from tillage, 
maintains soil cover with organic material, and diversifies crops through intercropping 
or rotations. These technologies and practices have been developed to stabilize 
production and reduce exposure to weather risk (Hansen et al., 2019). These risk-
reducing technologies could lend themselves well to being bundled with index 
insurance.  
Risk-reducing technologies and index insurance have the potential to 
complement each other and solve the problems they face when offered in isolation. 
Risk-reducing technologies may protect the farmer against moderate periods of 
drought, thus already providing a form of insurance. However, such varieties do not 
protect the farmer from extreme weather events. In fact, investments in risk-reducing 
technologies such as drought-tolerant seeds could expose farmers even more to extreme 
weather, because these seeds are typically more expensive than the local varieties that 
farmers grow. Vice versa, index insurance covers the farmer against extreme events, 
but paying out during moderate drought years would make the insurance policy more 
expensive. Proper bundling of the two and structuring insurance to trigger payouts only 
for extreme weather events may help resolve these issues by leveraging 
complementarities between the two types of innovations (Lybbert and Carter, 2013). 
Bundling with drought tolerant varieties would also add an implicit subsidy to the cost 
of insurance by reducing the cost of reinsurance due to the reduced value-at-risk that 
the insurer faces. 
Ward et al. (2019) tested this by eliciting the valuation for drought-tolerant rice 
and weather index insurance as complementary risk management tools among 
smallholder farmers in Bangladesh. Farmers generally did not value the drought-
tolerant variety enough to purchase it if offered independent of insurance, but when 
bundled with insurance, their valuation of the variety increased. Farmers also valued 
insurance on its own, but even more so when bundled with the drought-tolerant variety, 
suggesting strong complementarities between the two different risk management 
instruments. In a study in Odisha, India, Ward and Makhija (2018) find that smallholder 
farmers’ valuation for such a complementary risk management product is highly 
sensitive to the basis risk implied by the insurance product, with farmers less 
enthusiastic about risk management products that leave significant risks uninsured.3 
This is also consistent with the theoretical predictions in Kramer and Ceballos (2018) 
that in the presence of basis risk, calibrating weather index insurance bundled with 
stress-tolerant varieties to trigger insurance payouts only in case of extreme weather 
events can worsen demand.  
Another way of bundling CSA and insurance is through climate-smart insurance 
subsidies. India has a large national insurance scheme, in which premiums are highly 
subsidized; farmers only pay around 2-5% of the sum insured, and a small fraction of 
the insurance premiums (Fisher et al 2019). These premium subsidies could be used to 
promote more sustainable farming systems by conditioning premium subsidies on the 
adoption of climate-smart technologies and practices. This approach was piloted in the 
states of Punjab and Haryana, India, which face an environmental hazard from large-
scale crop residue burning. While testing a picture-based insurance approach, 
 
 
3 Ward et al. (2019) and Ward and Makhija (2018) use discrete choice experiments to elicit willingness to pay for 
the drought-tolerant seeds, insurance and the bundled product. Although these hypothetical measures of willingness 
to pay may not reflect actual willingness to pay for insurance versus seeds, the main purpose of the studies was to 
elicit the value of the bundled product relative to the value of the stand-alone products. 
researchers varied experimentally whether farmers received insurance coverage 
unconditional on management practices versus conditional on not burning residues. The 
no-burning condition significantly reduced the proportion of farmers burning their 
residues, suggesting that premium subsidies can be used to promote desirable 
behaviours that have positive externalities for the surrounding communities (Kramer 
and Ceballos, 2018). 
AR4D has also tested the potential for bundling insurance with other formal or 
informal financial services. Although weather index insurance can cover covariate risks 
such as droughts, basis risk in the insurance product design and idiosyncratic risks such 
as pests or disease could still lead to losses not covered by the insurance product. 
Bundling insurance products with other financial risk management instruments, either 
formal or informal, could help farmers cope with the financial losses from these 
uninsured risks, thereby potentially increasing take-up. In Ethiopia, researchers for 
instance tested the provision of insurance through informal funeral societies (iddirs) 
that traditionally share risk. Insurance take-up was considerably higher in groups where 
insurance trainings had emphasized risk sharing (Dercon et al., 2014), suggesting 
important complementarities between on the one hand informal risk sharing for 
idiosyncratic shocks and basis risk and on the other hand formal index insurance to cope 
with covariate shocks. 
Participatory approaches to index design and implementation 
Another component of AR4D utilizes participatory approaches in the design and 
implementation of index insurance. Participatory approaches hold two key functions: 
collecting data to explore and validate data sources and parameters of a product through 
crowdsourcing with farmers and local experts, and developing awareness, capacity and 
ownership of farmers and insurance stakeholders by engaging them throughout the 
design and validation process. 
The Social Network for Index Insurance Design (SNIID) process developed by 
the International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI), one of the partners 
in the CGIAR, is a farmer-centred index design process using participatory processes 
and crowdsourcing to collect information on cropping calendars, crop vulnerability, 
historical risk profiles and season monitoring to co-produce and validate index 
products. It is coupled with insurance games simulating farmers’ seasonal decision-
making processes in the face of risk, to explore preferred risk coping strategies and 
unpack complex concepts such as insurance, basis risk, frequency of payout, satellite 
data and comprehensive risk management strategies. Additional experimental research 
games can be played to explore specific questions such as farmers’ preferences 
regarding payout frequency, or group and individual insurance compared to other risk 
management options (Greatrex et al., 2015).  
Trust is an important component when delivering insurance. Co-producing the 
index product by engaging with farmers along every step of the way, from index design 
to implementation and payouts, will increase the understanding and attractiveness of 
insurance products. These participatory approaches are now being increasingly 
combined with mobile technologies to reach more farmers and help address the need to 
go to scale while keeping farmers at the centre of the process. 
Impact evaluation 
As argued earlier, take-up and renewal alone are insufficient indicators of impact. In 
general, high take-up and especially high renewal rates can offer a signal that an 
insurance scheme provides a first indication that insured clients perceive the insurance 
product to offer value for money, but the conclusion that the insurance program is 
welfare-enhancing, and does so in a cost-effective way, cannot be drawn at face value. 
Instead, AR4D can work with insurance initiatives to ascertain that insurance products 
are indeed welfare-enhancing for targeted farmers through an ex-ante cost-benefit 
analysis, prior to rolling out a program. In addition, by building long-term monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) components into insurance programs, economists and other 
social scientists within the AR4D community can help insurance initiatives conduct ex-
post impact assessments and identify the main channels through which these impacts 
occur.   
In designing impact evaluations, it is important to consider when impacts occur, 
when they are being observed, and how they can be measured. In this regard, it is 
important to distinguish between impacts ex ante, which would be unconditional on 
experiencing extreme weather events and receiving insurance payouts, and impacts ex 
post, which are experienced by beneficiaries who are affected by extreme weather 
events, and for whom the insurance product should make payouts. Moreover, data 
collection and analyses need to be centred around the core hypothesis that one of the 
main impacts of insurance is a smoothening of consumption, meaning that well-
designed impact evaluations measure consumption repeatedly over time, in order to 
assess whether insurance prevents food rationing and spending cuts among households 
facing weather shocks. The degree to which consumption smoothing generates welfare 
benefits also depends on beneficiaries’ preference for consumption smoothing, or risk 
aversion, meaning that it is important for impact evaluations to elicit such preference 
parameters. Prior to the roll-out of a scheme, AR4D, donors or governments and 
insurance industry can work together to design strategies to measure impacts on 
household welfare and conducting cost-benefit analyses. 
AR4D offers a toolbox of evaluation approaches that can help in this regard. 
These evaluation approaches are designed to address attribution problems in the sense 
that they help assessing whether differences between an intervention group and a 
counterfactual can be plausibly attributed to the insurance program. Simply evaluating 
outcomes by comparing insured and uninsured individuals or households often leads to 
selection bias, where those who choose to participate in the treatment (insurance) are 
systematically different than those who do not. Higher take-up is for instance observed 
among wealthier, more educated and more progressive farmers, who could have 
increased agricultural investments also in the absence of the insurance program, 
meaning that differences between the insured and the uninsured (even if measured over 
time) could be due to systematic differences in unobserved characteristics rather than 
the insurance program itself.  
Methods that help overcome this evaluation challenge include natural 
experiments, quasi-experimental approaches that rely on econometric techniques such 
as propensity score matching or regression discontinuity designs, and randomized 
control trials (RCTs). Researchers can use variation in whether individuals were offered 
insurance coverage, but often, in situations where such variation cannot be introduced, 
alternative strategies are often feasible in which smallholder farmers or other value 
chain actors are randomly assigned into an encouragement arm, which receives a 
promotion (for instance awareness raising or premium subsidies) to enrol, versus a 
control arm, where no additional encouragements are offered to sign up for the schemes. 
Different types of programs and implementation plans call for different evaluation 
strategies. Involving impact evaluation specialists from the AR4D community early in 
the program design can facilitate the integration of a long-term independent evaluation 
strategy into the roll-out plans of an insurance initiative. 
Conclusion/recommendations  
Insurance is an important tool that can enable farmers to manage better climate-related 
risks and to invest in more profitable production systems and practices. Index insurance 
payouts improve coping with extreme weather events, and indeed help smallholder 
farmers increase their agricultural investments even during years without insurance 
payouts. However, there is only sparse evidence of how these benefits translate to 
transformative impacts on the livelihoods of smallholder farmers, and the evidence 
often focuses on microinsurance programs implemented at a small scale. And while it 
is important that policymakers are calling for an increase in the number of insured 
smallholder farmers, the risk is that this focus on scaling is shifting insurers’ priorities 
from providing high-quality products, offering real value for their clients, to flooding 
the market with low-quality products that have not been adapted adequately to farmers’ 
local context, and with poor awareness of insurance benefits.  
In this light, it is imperative to look beyond take-up or renewal, and to document 
the welfare costs and benefits of different types of insurance programs as they are going 
to scale. This includes addressing the questions whether and how index insurance has 
transformed farmers’ livelihood strategies and incomes; and how it contributes to 
adaptation, without focusing only on how it improves responding to shocks. AR4D can 
help define and measure indicators of success needed at scale. In addition, AR4D can 
help identify opportunities to strengthen product quality and value propositions, for 
instance by helping programs overcome challenges in data availability, targeting and 
distribution of insurance, bundling with complementary risk management strategies, 
and embedding insurance into the agricultural value chain.  
AR4D produces evidence, methodologies and research products that are 
available to the insurance industry as public goods. Use of these public goods will 
however lead to impacts only if programs are developed, implemented and evaluated 
through strong partnerships. Agricultural insurance could be viewed as an extension of 
both financial services and agricultural development. It therefore falls within the 
domain of a broad spectrum of private- and public-sector actors, including the insurance 
sector (insurers, re-insurers), and stakeholders primarily interested in agricultural 
development (input providers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), farmer 
groups, policymakers and the AR4D community). Initiatives driven by one of these two 
sectors are likely to lack vital expertise and overlook viable solutions to the challenges. 
Partnerships between these various stakeholders, including AR4D, will be critical in 
order to build insurance programs that truly have the capacity to improve adaptation 
and resilience at scale among the rural poor. 
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